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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE SPEECH-RiGHT TO PICKET.-VOgt,

Inc. v. International Brotherhooc of Teamsters, AFL, 270 Wis.
315, 71 N.W.2d 359 (1955). The plaintiff was a producer and seller
of washed sand and gravel. The defendant had solicited the employees of the plaintiff to join the union but these solicitations
were unsuccessful. The defendant thereupon stationed pickets,
none of whom were employed by plaintiff, at the entrance to the
plaintiff's plant. As a result of the picketing, some of plaintiff's
suppliers refused to cross the picket line. The picketing was entirely peaceful. Plaintiff's employees were neither intimidated nor
coerced in any physical sense. Plaintiff sued to enjoin the
picketing on the ground that it violated a state statute. This
statute defines a labor dispute as a controversy between an employer and the majority of his employees. Wis. STAT. § 103.62 (3)
(1953). In the absence of this statutory labor dispute, picketing
is prohibited. Wis. STAT. § 103.535 (1953). The trial court found
that the plaintiff had no dispute with his employees or with the
union and therefore under the statute the picketing was illegal.
An injunction was granted permanently restraining the defendant union from all picketing at plaintiff's place of business.
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
on appeal was whether the picketing by defendant could be enjoined on the basis of these statutory provisions in view of the
constitutional guarantees of free speech.
In a unanimous opinion the court ordered the injunction dissolved and the case dismissed. The statutory definition of a
labor dispute was held to be an unconstitutional narrowing or
confinement of the right to picket.
The right to picket and its association with free speech had
its beginning in the famous Brandeis dictum in Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937):
Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization
by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of
speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.

The rationale of the Senn case, "supra,was that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not prohibit a state statutory authorization of
non-violent, fraudless picketing. What originated in almost casual
comment became in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940),
settled law; namely, that the right to peacefully picket was now
on a plane with freedom of speech. It was held in the Thornhill
case that if picketing was of a peaceful and truthful nature, it
(296)

19561

RECENT DECISIONS

was not to be transgressed by state law. Picketing restrictions
were henceforth to be tested under the "clear and present danger"
rule. Decided on the same day was Carlson v. California, 310
U.S. 106 (1940). Relying on the Thornhill doctrine, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a municipal ordinance which prohibited picketing for the purpose of inducing a change in labor
conditions. The Court said, 310 U.S. at 113:
[P]ublicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through
appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by
banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.

In Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287 (1941), where a state enjoined picketing which was
in itself peaceful but set in a context of violence, it was held
that the injunction was rightly granted. The Court did not apply
the "clear and present danger" test, but said that the Constitution
would not protect picketing if it had the effect of violene.
In AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), relied on substantially
in the principal case and factually similar, the Supreme Court
held that a state could not, by a common law policy, prohibit
peaceul picketing on the sole ground of no employer-employee
relationship between the disputants. The Court said, 312 U.S. at
325-326:
The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the
notion of a particular state regarding the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined
by statute or by the judicial organ of the state.
From the Thornhill case to the Swing case, the decisions of
the Court were following a logically consistent pattern. It was
rather certain that thus far a state could not constitutionally enjoin picketing which was peaceful and truthful and constituted no
"clear and present danger," Thornhill case, supra; Carlson case,
supra; but it could enjoin picketing set in a context of violence,
Milk Wagon Drivers case, supra; or when coupled with violence,
Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations.Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942).
What had -been essentially "clear in these decisions became
uncertain in Carpenters& JoinersUnion v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S.
722 (1942). Here the Court upheld an injunction issued under
a Texas penal code whose recognized statutory pupose was to
"localize" labor disputes. Ritter had employed a contractor to
construct a building one and one-half miles from Ritter's cafe. The
contractor. was given complete authority to hire laborers for
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the job. As a result of the contractor's hiring of non-union
carpenters, Ritter's cafe was picketed by the union. To further
pressure Ritter, his employees were called out on strike. An
injunction to restrain the peaceful picketing at the cafe was
granted. The majority of the Court reasoned that in the interest
of the general welfare a state could reasonably confine or
"localize" a labor dispute. The Court took the position that because picketing had been enjoined only at Ritter's place of
business the rights of the union had not been vitally circumscribed. In a vigorous dissent it was pointed out that freedom
of speech is to be given the broadest protection. Merely because the union was free to picket at places other than Ritter's
place of business did not alter the fact that it was restrained
from exercising its right to picket where it had chosen. It was
apparent after the Ritter case that the right to picket was not
at all the substantial equivalent of freedom of speech.
Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942), was
similar to the instant case in that the injunction was issued under
a "no labor dispute" statute. It was implied that an injunction
would be constitutionally proper if the picketing enjoined was
attended ". . . by violence, force or coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive. . . ." 315 U.S. at 775. The precise

meaning of "otherwise unlawful or oppressive" was not explained. In Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293
(1943), the Court refused to allow a broad injunction against all
picketing on the sole ground that the pickets had used abusive
tactics in imputing "fascism" and "unfairness" to the plaintiff.
Added to the suggested test in the Wohl case, supra, was the
"illegal purpose" viewpoint announced in Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). Here the Court upheld
an injunction issued under a Missouri restraint of trade statute.
The union had picketed a wholesale distributor of ice. Its prime
purpose was to induce sales to union peddlers and to no others.
A unanimous Court held that such picketing could not be
separated from its "illegal purpose." Since every state has the
right to legislate regarding restraint of trade the injunction was
held constitutionally proper.
The decisions in Building Service Employees Int'l Union v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950), InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) and Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), all decided the same day, brought
to this evolving doctrine a radical addition. In the Gazzam case
the union picketed to coerce the employer to compel his employees to join the union. The Court held that the state's public
policy, as set out in its statutes, under which the picketing was
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enjoined, prevented the injunction from being regarded as an
infringement of constitutional guarantees. The Court in the
Hughes case upheld an injunction issued to restrain picketing
which was intended to force a store owner to hire Negroes in
proportion to the percentage of Negro customers. The Court
was of the opinion that this restraint was the exercise of a
reasonable public policy. The philosophy behind these decisions was succinctly expressed in the Hanke case, 339 U.S. at
478-479:
[W]e cannot conclude that Washington, in holding the picketing in
these cases to be for an unlawful object, has struck a balance so
inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people that it must
be found an unconstitutional choice.

After the Gazzam, Hanke, and Hughes cases it was clear that
the original equation of free speech and picketing set down in the
Thornhill case, while not actually overruled, had been severly
limited.
Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeyman Plumbers & Steam,
fitters v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953), the most recent Supreme
Court decision on picketing, upheld an injunction granted
under a Virginia "right to work" statute, on the authority of the
Gazzam, Hanke, and Hughes cases. Apparently the Court felt
that the policy of Virginia announced in right to work laws was
not "so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people that
it must be found an unconstitutional choice." Hanke case, 339
U.S. at 479.
The instant case, in the light of the most recent Supreme Court
decisions, is open to adverse criticism. Certainly as compared to
the Swing or Wohl cases the decision is correct. While these cases
have not been overruled it would seem that after the Gazzam,
Hanke, and Hughes cases the exact area in which a state may
constitutionally enjoin picketing is a matter to be tested by a
norm of reasonableness of existing state law as measured against
due process. It is submitted that the right to peacefully picket,
so essential to the cause of labor, requires a more certain
position in the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rightsif such protection is to have real meaning.
Lawrence A. Kane, Jr.
CoRPo1RToxs-Ex xwATioN oF RECORDS-RI GT OF Ex-DiRECTOR TO E
CoRPoRATE Boos.- Cohen v. Cocoline
Products,Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127 N.E.2d 906 (1955). Petitioner
was an active director of the defendant company at the time
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this suit was instituted. Believing that the president of the
corporation was misappropriating corporate moneys, he demanded an inspection of the corporate books and records but was
refused. He then brought this action in the nature of mandamus
to compel the corporation to permit him to examine the books.
On December 20, 1954, the special term ruled in favor of
petitioner but did not sign an order at that time. Later the same
day the stockholders of the corporation held a meeting for the
purpose of electing a new board of directors. Petitioner was not
re-elected. In view of this, the corporation moved for and was
granted a re-hearing by the court which, on the basis of the
pleadings and affidavits only, adhered to its former decision that
petitioner had a right to examine the corporate books. This was
affirmed by the appellate division and the court of appeals
granted leave to appeal.
The issue on appeal was whether or not an ex-director of a
corporation has a right to inspect the corporate books. The New
York Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings. The court stated that since an ex-director
is potentially liable for the wrongful acts committed by the
board of directors and officers during his tenure of office, he has
a qualified right to inspect the books and records covering that
period upon making a proper showing that such inspection is
necessary to protect his personal interest as well as the interests
of the stockholders. Therefore, if the decision of the lower court
was based on the theory that petitioner had an absolute right
of inspection, it was in error. If it was based on the exercise of
discretion, it was also error, for only after a hearing should the
court have resolved the issues raised as to the propriety of the
purpose for which petitioner sought the inspection.
At common law a stockholder was given a qualified right to
inspect the corporate books and records at a proper time and
place and for a proper purpose. The reason for this rule was to
make available to the stockholder the information necessary to
enable him to exercise his rights and protect his interests as a
stockholder. News-Journal Corp. v. State ex rel. Gore, 136 Fla.
620, 187 So. 271 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 1 So. 2d 559 (1941),
aff'd per curiam, 8 So. 2d 439 (1942). See Miller v. Spanogle, 275
Ill. App. 335, 340 (1934) (dictum); Cravatts v. Klozo Fastener
Corp., 205 Misc. 781, 133 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(dictum); In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103, 1107 (1899).
This right of a stockholder is dependent upon his motive in
seeking the inspection of the corporate books, and if it is shown
that he is not acting in good faith or has improper motives, the
inspection may be denied him. Merritt v. Forty Wall Street Bldg.
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Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (dictum). See Cravatts
v. KIozo Fastener Corp., supra, at page 238 (dictum).
Today the right of a stockholder to examine the corporate
books is largely controlled by statute. Some of the states have
codified the common law doctrine with little variation. N.Y. STOCK
CORP. LAW § 10; UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-2-32 (Supp. 1955).
The right of a director to examine the corporate books was also
recognized at common law. But, unlike the right of the stockholder, the director's right is absolute and unqualified. The basis
of this distinction lies in the difference between the duties of the
two and the rights sought to be protected. See State ex tel.
Dixon v. Missouri-KansasPipe Line Co., 3 Terry 423, 36 A.2d
29, 30 (Del. Super. Ct. 1944); Machen v. Machen & Mayer Elec.
Mfg. Co., 237 Pa. 212, 85 Atl. 100, 104 (1912). As stated above,
the right of the stockholder is granted primarily to protect the
individual interest of the stockholder. On the other hand, the
duty of a director is to intelligently manage the corporation's
activities and protect its interests. This requires that his right of
inspection be absolute. Machen v. Machen & Mayer Elec. Mfg.
Co., supra.
Although the courts today universally recognize the right of a
director to examine the corporate books, they are not in agreement as to whether or not a hostile motive on the part of the
director will affect this right. By the great weight of authority,
the motive of the director in making an inspection of the corporate
books is irrelevant. All the director need show to have this right
enforced by the courts is that he is a director and upon demand
has been refused inspection by the corporation. Wilkins v. M.
Ascher Silk Corp., 207 App. Div. 168, 201 N.Y. Supp. 739 (1st
Dep't 1923), affd per curiam, 237 N.Y. 574, 143 N.E. 748 (1924).
Accord, State ex Tel. Dixon v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.,
supra; Machen v. Machen & Mayer Elec. Mfg. Co., supra. Where
the motives of the director are hostile to the interests of the
corporation, the remedy of the corporation is to remove him
from office. People ex tel. Leach v. Central Fish Co., 117 App.
Div. 77, 101 N.Y. Supp. 1108 (1st Dep't 1907).
The contrary rule that the director's improper or hostile
motive will defeat his right to inspect the books is followed by a
small minority of the courts. Cf. Hemingway v. Hemingway, 58
Conn. 443, 19 Atl. 766 (1890). Thus in State ex rel. Paschall v.
Scott, 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952), the court refused to
enforce the director's right of inspection. It appeared that the
officer's purpose was to ruin the corporation by giving the information obtained to competitors of the corporation. The court
reasoned that a director may be denied the right to inspect the
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corporate books and records when it is shown that he has a
hostile or improper motive. An improper motive is wholly inconsistent with the performance of the director's corporate duties
upon which the right is based. Accord, Strassburger v. Philadelphia Record Co., 335 Pa. 485, 6 A.2d 922, 924 (1939) (dictum).
From the above mentioned cases it would seem that when the
director is discharged, he no longer has the absolute right to
inspect the corporate books, for he no longer has the duties upon
which the right is based. This was the view taken by the court in
Overland v. LeRoy Foods, Inc., 279 App. Div. 876, 110 N.Y.S.2d
578 (2d Dep't 1952), aff'd mem. 304 N.Y. 573, 107 N.E.2d 74
(1952). It appeared that the petitioning director was removed
from his position before the court order permitting inspection
was made, but after the suit was instituted. The court held that
the director did not have an absolute right to inspect the corporate
books. Accord, Hymes v. Riveredge Printers, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d
200 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Where the director resigned and then brought suit for an
order to compel the corporation to permit him to examine the
books, the Supreme Court of New York emphatically stated
that not only did he lose the absolute right of a director, but he no
longer had any right of inspection. Cravatts v. Klozo Fastener
Corp., supra. The court said, 133 N.Y.S.2d at page 237:
Thus, if a director resigns, or is removed from office, or is not reelected and his successor is appointed, his right to inspect the books
and records of the corporation terminates. (emphasis added)

Accord, Application of Hafter, 67 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 808, 71 N.E.2d 774 (1947).
In the Overland, Hymes, Cravatts, and Hafter cases, supra, all
decided in the past ten years, there was no question before the
court as to whether or not an ex-director had a qualified privilege
of inspection. However, it is interesting to note that the probable
inception of this qualified right of an ex-director was as early as
1910. In People ex rel. Stauffer v. Bonwit Bros., 69 Misc. 70, 125
N.Y. Supp. 958 (Sup. Ct. 1910), the director seeking inspection of
the corporate books was a mere dummy appointed to comply
with a statute requiring that there must be a minimum of three
directors. The court said, 125 N.Y. Supp. at page 959:
For his own protection and that of the creditors, he is entitled to
examine the books up to the time of his removal, and, if the removal
be sudden, then I think that he should have opportunity for a
reasonable time thereafter to do so.

This was the first case holding that an ex-director may have a
right as an ex-director to examine the corporate books.
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In People ex rel. Bellman v. StandardMatch Co., 208 App. Div.
4, 202 N.Y. Supp. 840 (2d Dep't 1924), the petitioner was a director of a corporation which had gone into voluntary dissolution.
The court held that he did not have an absolute right as would a
director of a going corporation, but only a qualified right to
inspect the corporate books and records in furtherance of his
duties after dissolution. In the instant case it was also held that
an ex-director had only a qualified right of inspection. Although
an ex-director may be compared with a director of a dissolved
corporation, it must be remembered that the right of the latter is
still based upon corporate duty while the ex-director's right is
based upon his potential personal liability for wrongful acts done
by the board of directors and officers during the period he held
office.
In Application of La Vin, 37 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1942), the
court clearly held that an ex-director has a right to examine the
corporate books and announced the reason for the existence of
that right. The court said, 37 N.Y.S.2d at page 162-163:
Since it is conceded that the petitioner was a director until June
9, 1942, I am of the opinion that he is entitled to examine the books
and records up to that date, for whatever responsibility was his
as a director continued at least until that date, and said responsibility with respect to the affairs of the corporation up to that date

does not cease by his failure of re-election.

The facts in the above case are much like those in the instant
case and it would appear that the holdings are the same. In both
cases, the petitioning director failed to be re-elected to office the
same day that he received a court order to compel the corporation
to allow him to inspect the corporate books. Also, in both cases,
his resulting qualified right of inspection was based upon his
potential personal liability for wrongful acts of the board of
directors and the officers during the period he held office. However, there is no mention of Application of La Vin, supra, in the
decision of the court in the principal case. In fact, the three
dissenting judges in the instant case base their dissent upon
the fact that the holding is without precedent and in conflict with
all previous decisions.
It should be noted that, like the stockholder, the ex-director
seeks the right to inspect the corporate books and records
primarily for the purpose of protecting his own individual
interests. Therefore, the reasons which demand that a stockholder
be given a qualified right of examining the corporate books
should also apply to an ex-director. If the ex-director were
afforded no right of inspection whatsoever, he would be deprived
of a means of protecting himself from liability for the wrongs
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committed by the corporation while he was a director. He would
have no means of determining the extent or nature of his liability,
unless he had participated in the wrong personally. He can do
nothing but wait until a suit is begun against him. Moreover, the
corporation could possibly hide its wrongful conduct by dismissing
a director who had become too suspicious. It is submitted that the
best and most equitable view is the one which affords the
ex-director a qualified right, comparable to that of the stockholder, to examine the corporate books and records.
Vernon 0. Teofan

CORPORATIONS - FRAUDULENT ACTS OF DIRECTORS - DISINTERESTED MAJORITY OF SHAREHOLDERS CAN RATIFY DIRECTORS' FRAUD
THE CoRPORATiN.-Claman v. Robertson,. . . Ohio St.
128 N.E.2d 429 (1955). Plaintiff, a shareholder of Kroger
....
Corporation, brought a derivative action against the directors and
certain officers of the corporation, and one of its subsidiaries, to
rescind an allegedly fraudulent sale of a new issue of the subsidiary's common stock to the officers and directors of both corporations at a price below actual value. Prior to the sale, all
common stock of the subsidiary was owned by Kroger Corporation so that the sale to defendants was possible only if the corporation waived its statutory pre-emptive right to purchase the
new stock. This right was waived by the board of directors, and
at the next stockholders meeting a resolution ratifying the
waiver was approved by a majority of the stockholders. Plaintiff
failed to make a demand upon the stockholders to bring this
action prior to instituting the suit, and on this basis the trial
court dismissed his petition. This decision was affirmed by the
appellate court with a minor modification.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, plaintiff contended
that since the transaction complained of was fraudulent, the
stockholders were incapable of ratifying it, and therefore no prior
demand upon them to bring this suit was necessary. The question
presented for the first time to the Supreme Court of Ohio was
whether a disinterested majority of the shareholders of a corporation could ratify the fraudulent acts of the board of directors.
The court held, one justice dissenting, that a disinterested majority of shareholders could ratify such acts provided that there
was no actual fraud in procuring the ratification. Consequently,
a prior demand upon the shareholders to bring the suit remained
a condition precedent to a derivative action even where the transaction complained of was alleged to be fraudulent. Since plaintiff
had failed to make the necessary demand, the lower court's action

AGAINST
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in dismissing his petition was affirmed.
The question under consideration is limited to ratification by
a disinterested majority of shareholders. If the ratifying majority
profit by the transaction to the detriment of the minority, the
ratification is not binding. Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n,
231 Ill. 594, 83 N.E. 434 (1907); Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104
Mass. 378 (1870).
The power of a majority of the shareholders, whether disinterested or not, to ratify directors' fraud on the corporation
was denied in Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7,
99 N.E. 138 (1912), a decision widely cited as authority for the
non-ratification rule. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S.
123, 144 (1933) (dissenting opinion); Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F.
Supp. 167, 170 (D. Conn. 1950); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y.
113, 100 N.E. 721, 725 (1912). The Continental Securities Co.
case, supra, involved an action by a shareholder against the
corporation and certain directors to set aside an allegedly fraudulent sale of corporate stock. As in the instant case, the defendants
set up as a defense plaintiff's failure to make a prior demand upon
the shareholders to bring the suit. It was held that where the
shareholders had neither the power to remedy nor to ratify the
wrong committed, no demand upon them was necessary prior
to bringing a derivative action. The court conceded that certain
unauthorized acts of directors could be ratified by a majority
of shareholders, but it was also made clear that no such power
existed where the acts were fraudulent or illegal. In subsequent
decisions in New York it was definitely established that the nonratification rule as set out in the Continental Securities Co., case
was the law of New York. Dana v. Morgan, 219 Fed. 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1914), aff'd, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916); Rosenfeld v.
FairchildEngine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291, 294 (1955) (dictum); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., supra.
In Toebelman v. Missouri-KansasPipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016
(3d Cir. 1942), the plaintiff shareholder appealed from a summary
judgment in a derivative suit against the directors for allegedly
fraudulent mismanagement of the corporate business. Defendants
set up as a defense a general ratification of the directors' acts by
a majority of the shareholders. The court held that under Delaware law a majority of the shareholders could not ratify or
sanction a director's fraudulent act. Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del.
Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938). Accord, Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit
Corp., 30. Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (1948).
The question of the validity of stockholder ratification often
arises in an action to set aside a transaction by which directors
or officers have awarded additional compensation to themselves.
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The limitation on the majority stockholders to authorize this
compensation is stated in the dissenting opinion in Rogers v.
Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1932):
If a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for
which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part, and the majority
stockholders have no power to give away corporate property against
the protest of the minority.

This opinion was adotped by the Supreme Court in Rogers v.
Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
Compensation to directors beyond the reasonable value of their
services would be a fraud upon the stockholders, and similarly
ratification of directors' acts in fixing their compensation beyond
this limit would constitute ratification of fraud. Russell v. Henry
C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 Atl. 136 (1911). In Keenan v.
Eshleman, supra, a derivative action was brought to recover payments for fictitious management services to another corporation
which was controlled by the directors of the paying corporation.
The directors were in effect being paid twice for their services.
In rejecting the defense of stockholder ratification, the court
stated, 2 A.2d 904 at 909: "... acts which are ultra vires, illegal
or fraudulent are expressely expected from the class of acts
subject to ratification." Accord, Slutzker v. Rieber, 132 N.J. Eq.
406, 28 A.2d 525 (1942) ; Russell v. Henry C. PattersonCo., supra.
But where a self awarded increase in compensation is reasonable
in view of the services performed, the directors' act does not constitute fraud and a subsequent stockholder ratification may validate the act. Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., supra.
The validity of the majority's ratification or passive acceptance
of fraud against the corporation by directors was upheld in Kessler
v. Ensley Co., 123 Fed. 546 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1903), 129 Fed. 397
(C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904), 141 Fed. 130 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1905), aff'c
per curiam, 148 Fed. 1019 (5th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 205 U.S.
541 (1907). Here the directors of an insolvent land company
gained possession of corporate property by an allegedly fraudulent
conveyance of the property to trustees, and subsequent purchase
from the trustees by another company formed for that purpose
by the same directors. Although the court expressed doubt as to
whether the transaction was actually fraudulent, it was stated
that even if fraud were present, the refusal of the directors and
shareholders to bring suit with full knowledge of the facts was
binding on the minority.The transaction complained of was held
to be intra vires the corporate powers but voidable if the shareholders should so elect. This decision was based on the premise
that the corporate entity, like the individual, is free to choose its
course of action when it has been wronged. When directors are
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implicated in the wrong, this decision must be made by the
majority of the shareholders. Having only derivative rights, the
individual shareholder could not require the corporation to act
to its detriment. It is significant that this decision presupposes
an informed body of shareholders who act with full knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the fraudulent transaction.
Further support for the discretionary power of the majority is
found in dictum in American Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 80 So. 2d 487,
492 (Ala. 1954), in which the Kessler case, supra, is cited with
approval. In the petition for rehearing petitioner contended that a
demand upon shareholders prior to bringing a derivative action
was not necessary where fraud was alleged because the majority
lacked the power to ratify the fraudulent acts. Petitioner relied
upon Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont to this effect. In
denying the petition, the court stated that this proposition is not
and never was the law of Alabama. 80 So. 2d at 493.
Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 Pac.
737 (1929), involved an action to set aside the sale of corporate
stock at an inadequate price in pursuance of an alleged scheme to
loot the corporation. In reversing the trial court's finding for the
plaintiff, the court expressed doubt as to whether the transaction
was fraudulent but based its decision on a ratification of the
transaction at a subsequent stockholders meeting. As in the
Kessler case, supra, the transaction was considered to be a
question of business policy and voidable at the option of the
majority of the shareholders. In S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc.
v. New England Theatres OperatingCorp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d
241 (1950), the court denied the right of a minority shareholder to
bring action against directors for alleged fraud because a majority
of the shareholders had voted not to bring action on the claim
asserted by the plaintiff. The court distinguished between a judgment by the majority not to sue and ratification of fraud, professing no opinion as to the efficacy of the latter. In holding the
minority bound by the majority's decision not to sue, the court
ruled that where the majority decide reasonably and in good
faith not to enforce a claim, this is a legitimate exercise of the
majority's prerogative to determine business policy.
The instant case stands opposed to the rule that a majority
of stockholders cannot ratify directors' fraud as exemplified in the
Continental Securities Co. case, which represents the prevailing
majority rule. The rationale of the instant case is obstensibly
similar to that of the Kessler and Solomont cases, on which
the court relies, with emphasis on the concept of majority
leadership. However, in its flat assertion that a disinterested majority may ratify directors' fraud provided only that there is no
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actual fraud in procuring the ratification, the court goes further
than in either of these cases. Underlying the concern for corporate
democracy, the court in the instant case feared that power in the
minority to overthrow the decision of the majority would result in a flood of vexatious litigation. The only alternative which
the court saw to valid majority ratification of fraud was a
statute requiring the contesting stockholder to post security as
evidence of good faith. This was viewed as an unsatisfactory last
resort.
It is submitted that this decision, insofar as it validates ratification of directors' fraud upon the corporation by a majority of
shareholders, is an unwise departure from a rule which provided
a necessary safeguard for the protection of minority shareholders.
The rationale of this decision might be applicable to a close corporation where the shareholders, being few in number, could act
with full knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the proposed ratification. In the case of a large publicly owned corporation, with ownership and control in different bodies, it would
be unrealistic to believe that a ratification solicited by proxy is
anything other than evidence that management has retained
control. It appears that in attempting to avoid the necessity of
strike suit legislation, the court has chosen the greater of the
possible evils.
Thomas S. Calder

CORPORATIONS-PROXY

FIGHT EXPENSE S-C

ORPORATE REIM-

GROUP.-Rosenfeld v. FairchildEngine
and Airplane Corp.,... N.Y. . .. , 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). A stock-

BURSEMENT OF INSURGENT

holders' derivative action was brought by the plaintiff against
the defendant and its past and present directors to compel the
return of payments made out of corporate funds to cover the
cost of a proxy contest. Both the insurgent group and the management group were reimbursed for expenses incurred in waging the contest. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the merits
by the official referee. The judgment of the referee was affirmed
by the appellate court. This appeal followed.
The problem presented to the court of appeals was whether
corporate funds could be used to reimburse both the incumbent
and insurgent groups for expenses incurred in a proxy contest
for the control of the corporation. The court held that the incumbent group could make use of corporate funds to cover expenses
reasonably and properly incurred in a proxy contest. As to the
insurgents, the court held that they could be reimbursed from
the corporate treasury for "reasonable and bona fide expenses"

1956]

RECENT DECISIONS

by a majority vote of the stockholders. The court attached two
other requirements to both groups, viz., that the contest should
have been one over policy as opposed to a purely personal power
contest, and second, that any reimbursement should be subject
to the close scrutiny of the courts.
As indicated by the court in the principal case, the question
whether either the insurgents or incumbents can be reimbursed
for proxy fight expenses depends on the answers to two other
inquiries: (1) was the proxy contest one over policy or for personal gain, and (2) are the expenses reasonable. This is the
reasoning which is followed by the courts. Hand v. MissouriKansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del. 1944), Empire
Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 29 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.2d 741 (1946)
(dictum). Also see, STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 123 (2d ed. 1949), 5
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS

§ 2058.1 (rev. ed. 1952).

The requirement that the proxy contest be over corporate
policy has been criticized by both courts and writers. Steinberg
v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); EMERSON AND
LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR
CoRPoRATiows 72 (1954). In the Steinberg case, supra, the court

noted that it is often hard to determine whether a contest is one
over policy or over personnel. Often a change in policy is brought
about only by a change in personnel.
Actually, unless opposing directors are men of no ideas or policies
at all, the limitation that the contest be one over policy has no
meaning and might as well be forgotten by the courts. EDaIESON
SHAREHOLDER DEmOCRACY, A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR
AND LATCHAa,
CoRP oRATIoNs 72 (1954).

Regardless of the criticism of this principle, the courts have adhered to it in their decisions. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture
Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Atl. 226 (1934).
The nature of the contest must be looked at to see if it is one where
it can be said that only the selfish desires of incumbent directors
to hold on to their positions are at stake. 171 AUt. at 229.

What the courts have really seemed to be seeking in these cases
is a justification for reimbursement based upon corporate benefit
as opposed to individual gain.
After it is first determined that reimbursement is warranted,
the second question to be decided is whether the expenses incurred are reasonable. This necessitates a look into the manner in
which the proxies were procured. In Lawyers' Advertising Co.
v. ConsolidatedRy. L. & F. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907),
the court held that only the cost of mailing the proxy to the
stockholders itself was deductible as an expense, and that ex-
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penses incurred by placing advertisements in newspapers urging
the execution of the proxy statements were unreasonable and
improper. In Hand v. Missouri-KansasPipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp.
649 (D. Del. 1944), the court refused to enjoin management
from using professional proxy solicitors in a proxy contest as
there was no threat of irreparable damage in any way. However,
it should be noted that the court did not decide whether or not
expenses incurred in the use of professional proxy solicitors
were reasonable. The consensus of opinion seems to be that activities of professional proxy solicitors have a tendency to coerce
shareholders in the execution of their proxies and on this basis
the fees paid to them should not be regarded as a reasonable

and proper expenditure. EMERSON AND LATCHAIVI, SHAREHOLDER
DEMOCRACY, A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 73 (1954).
Friedman, Expenses of CorporateProxy Contests, 51 COLUm. L.
REV. 951, 955 (1951).
So far the only consideration has been whether or not corporate funds are expendable by incumbents for proxy contests.
Yet another problem is presented in determining whether the insurgents are entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in
waging a proxy fight. The first case in which it was decided that
insurgent directors could be reimbursed for proxy expenses was
Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). In this
case the court said at 607-608:

My own choice is to draw no distinction between the "ins" and
the successful "outs". I see no reason why the stockholders should
not be free to reimburse those whose expenditures succeeded in
ridding a corporation of a policy frowned upon by a majority
of the stockholders. Once we assert that incumbent directors may
employ corporate funds .

.

. it seems permissible to me that those

who advocate a contrary policy and succeed in securing approval
from the stockholders should be able to receive reimbursement....

The reasoning of the proposition is sound. EMERSON

AND
LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR

76 (1952). However, is winning the proxy contest a prerequisite for the applicability of corporate funds to
cover the cost of the contest? If the theory behind allowing
corporate funds to be used for this purpose is that of benefit to
the corporation, it seems to follow that the group opposing management on reasonable grounds should be entitled to reimbursement for their expenses incurred in asserting this opposition, regardless of who succeeds. Friedman, Expenses of Corporate
Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 951, 956 (1951).
In the principal case, the court determined that since the contest was one over corporate policy, both the incumbent group
CORPORATIONS,
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and the insurgent group were entitled to be reimbursed for the
expenses of the contest. Plaintiff did not raise the question
-whether these expenses were reasonable and therefore the court
4did not consider this issue. It is important to note that the corporation here was a closed corporation and the reimbursement
contested had been affirmed by a 16 to 1 vote of the stockhold-

ers. Perhaps the holding as to the insurgent group will be limited
to this type of corporation in future decisions. On the basis of

the facts in this case however, the question was correctly decided
in the light of established principles.
John Rogers

EQurr
,INJUNCTON-RESTRCT=VE CovENAMNT IN EMPLOY3ENT CONTRACT HELD UNREASONABLE. - Welcome Wagon, Inc. v.

Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955). Defendant had been employed by plaintiff to introduce to new residents in the community
a number of products of local merchants. An agreement was executed between the parties containing a covenant in which defendant agreed that she would not, during her term of employment or for five years thereafter, engage in the same or similar
business as that engaged in by plaintiff. The covenant was to cover
(1) the city of Gastonia, N. C., and/or (2) any other community
in the United States or Canada in which the plaintiff was engaged

in rendering services or had signified an intention of so doing. The
defendant resigned from her employment with plaintiff and since
then has been doing similar work on her own. This suit was
brought to enjoin defendant from violating the restrictive covemant in her contract of employment. The district court denied
relief on the ground that the new work of defendant was not comparable to that which she has done for plaintiff.
On appeal it was held that, although the present work of defendant was similar to that done while employed by plaintiff, the
duration of the restriction was entirely too long and the territory
covered by it was too vast to be reasonably necessary to protect
plaintiff. The judgment of the district court was affirmed on the
ground that this covenant was unreasonably oppressive to defendant.
The issue presented to the court of appeals was: When will a
court restrain a violation of a restrictive covenant in an employment contract?
As was stated in the principal case, courts have been hesitant
in enforcing these clauses in employment contracts, because they
restrict an employee in the pursuit of his livelihood. Pancake
Realty Co. v. Harber,137 W. Va. 605, 73 S.E.2d 438 (1952). How-
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ever, the courts are seemingly willing to enforce the restrictive
covenant if it is (1) necessary for the protection of the employer's
business; (2) not unreasonable to the employee in his efforts to
earn a living; and (3) not such a restraint of trade as to be opposed to public policy. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 116 (1955).
From the employer's standpoint, the courts are more likely to
give recognition to his need for protection in situations where
some secret process or formula is made known to the employee.
In these cases, even though the restrictive covenants are unlimited
as to time or place, they have been upheld and the employees enjoined from violating them. Larx Co. v. Nicol, 224 Minn. 1, 28
N.W.2d 705 (1946). These processes need not be known only to
the employer and his employees if they are methods which are
considered confidential to most business men in similar trades.
Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99,
46 A.2d 201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946).
To uphold these restrictive covenants it is not, however, necessary that the employee has acquired knowledge of a trade secret.
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.d 823 (Utah 1951). It will
suffice if the covenant is necessary for the protection of the
employer from the loss of customers and good will, even though
these customers and good will are the direct results of the employee's efforts. Jewel Paint & Varnish Co. v. Walters, 339 Ill.
App. 335, 89 N.E. 2d 835 (1950). The employer, as pointed out in
the principal case, cannot unduly restrict the employee if the restraint will deprive the public of any unusual talent of which the
community has need and where the restricted area is excessive, it
will be reduced by the court. Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan. 714, 215
P. 2d 133 (1950); Haysler v. Butterfield, 240 Mo. App. 733, 218
S.W.2d 129 (1949).
Even though the business of the employer is of a general type,
i. e., not involving any trade secrets, a restrictive covenant which
is unlimited as to time or place is generally not enforced. DavisRobertson Agency v. Duke, 119 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Va. 1953);
Calhoun v. Everman, 242 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1951). The reason
why the covenant is disregarded in these cases seems to be that
the employer has no substantial right peculiar to his business
which the court can protect without imposing an undue hardship
upon the employee.
Whether the restraint to be imposed by an employment contract is reasonable is an equitable question which must be determined by the court. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, 204
Ga. 794, 51 S.E.2d 669, 675 (1949) (dictum). Factors which are
generally taken into consideration by the judge are: (1) the type
of business of the employer; (2) the services performed by the
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employee; and (3) whether enforcement of the covenant is necessary for the protection of the employer and is a reasonable restraint upon the employee. (That the covenant is not enforced by
equity does not foreclose the covenantee from a legal action for
damages). Calhoun v. Everman, supra. The test of reasonableness
which was used by the court in the principal case, as well as by the
majority of American courts in deciding this issue, is what is a
reasonable restraint in reference to a particular case.
Time limitations as extensive as five years, Allen v. Rose Park
Pharmacy,supra, and two years, Parkerv. Smith, 254 S.W.2d 144
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952) have been approved. Where no mention of
time has been made, but the area covered by the restriction has
been limited, a reasonable time under the circumstances presented has been set by the court and the restriction held valid.
Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchinson and Overton Clinic, 269 S.W.2d
798 (Tex. 1954).
It is the area from which the employee is to be excluded that
more often fails to meet with the approval of the courts. Applying
the test of "reasonableness" to territorial provisions, the court
stated in Parkerv. Smith, supra, 254 S.W.2d at 146:
...such restrictions when reasonable will be enforced and may
be as extensive as the interest or benefit sought to be protected.
On this basis, the courts have found the trading area of a city
to be unreasonable, Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, Inc.,
186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946) (covenant not to compete in
small loan business), while an area covering one-half the continental United States has been found reasonable, A. Hollander
& Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N. J. 235, 66 A.2d
319 (1949) (covenant not to compete in fur dressing and dyeing
business). The bare allegation that the employer is doing business
in the area is not enough to make reasonable the scope of a clause
which would work an extreme hardship upon the employee.
J.C. Pirkle Mach. Co. v. Walters, 205 Ga. 167, 52 S.E.2d 853
(1949). Nor can a covenant stand which does not prescribe adequately the business to be prohibited even though the area was
well defined. Friedman v. Friedman, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 860
(1953). The less restrictive the covenant the more likely it is
to be held valid. See Moore v. Snodgress, 203 Okla. 572, 223 P.2d
1080 (1950).
If no territorial limits are stated in the argeement, the courts
will not attempt to define the area and will refuse to enforce the
covenant. Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber,supra. Should the area
covered by the contract be shown to be too extensive, there is
no unaminity of opinion as to what course the courts would
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follow. As in the principal case the court may refuse to divide
the territory. Some courts will divide the area only if it covers
separate geographical units, Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood,
69 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Ill. 1946), while others, if the area is a
single territorial unit, will limit the covenant to a reasonable area
in order not to interfere with the freedom of contract. Falk v.
Struxness, supra.
From the above discussion it can be seen that the standard of
a reasonable limitation is the test that is universally applied by
the courts in these cases. Considering the nature of restrictive
covenants this test is the most practical one that could be used
by courts of equity in these situations. What is reasonable must
be determined by examining all the facts of the particular case.
In doing this in the principal case, the court concluded that the
territory covered by the agreement was too extensive, as was the
length of time the agreement was to be in effect. On this basis
the negative covenant was rightly declared invalid.
James Carroll Booth

LABOR LAw-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION UNDER LMRA-INABimnTY
ENJOIN PICKETING OF AN INTERSTATE EMPLOYER.-Grimes & Hauer, Inc. v. Pollock, 163 Ohio St. 372, 127
OF STATE COURT TO

N.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 76 Sup. Ct. 178 (1955). Plaintiff, an interstate employer engaged in the processing and retailing of poultry,
was not unionized. Representatives of defendant union contacted
several of plaintiff's employees with the hope of unionizing the
company. After nearly a month of fruitless negotiations, the
picketing of plaintiff's business locations by members of the union
began in a quiet, orderly manner. The pickets carried "sandwich"
signs in front of plaintiff's direct retail stores bearing the wording,
"This Market Does Not Employ Union Help. Please Do Not Patronize." In front of the stores where plaintiff leased space, the
signs carried by the pickets read, "Grimes & Hauer Poultry Does
Not Employ Union Help." Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the
picketing. The trial court assumed jurisdiction and, after considerable determination, entered a decree enjoining the picketing.
After first affirming the judgment of the trial court, the court of
appeals, upon rehearing, reversed the decision below and entered judgment for the defendant.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court was called
upon to determine whether or not a state court could assert jurisdiction over a case involving the peaceful picketing of an employer engaged in interstate commerce, where the activity complained of fell within the provisions of the Labor Management Re-
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lations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952) (commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act). The court held that
since a case of this type fell within the provisions of the TaftHartley Act, a state court was without jurisdiction to settle the
controversy. This holding was based on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Garnerv. Teamsters Union,
AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
In December, 1953, the Supreme Court held that Congress, by
the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, had pre-empted the field
of labor disputes. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, supra. In
that case, petitioner carried on an interstate trucking business
in Pennsylvania. A small minority of its employees were members of the respondent union. No labor dispute or strike existed
nor had petitioner objected to the unionization of its employees.
The union placed two pickets at the company's loading platform
in an effort to persuade petitioner to urge its employees to join
the union. While the picketing was peaceful and orderly, petitioner's business fell off nearly ninety-five per cent due to the
fact that employees of other carriers refused to cross the picket
line established by the respondent's pickets.
Petitioner sought relief in the state court, and an injunction
was issued to prevent the picketing on the ground that it was a
violation of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act. In reversing
the lower court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the grievance was within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board. The Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed and held that while there was a violation of the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, if the activity was also prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, any state action was precluded.
The result of the Garner decision was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB over all labor disputes which may affect interstate commerce. In order to facilitate its own handling of
cases, the NLRB set up "jurisdictional yardsticks," the meeting
of which was a condition precedent to NLRB action. 19 NLRB
ANN. REP. 2 (1954). Under these standards, the scope of the jurisdiction of the NLRB was limited. The combined effect of the
Garner case and the promulgation of the jurisdictional standards
by the NLRB was to leave a number of employers without a remedy when they suffered injuries as a result of a labor dispute. See
Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks' Local 1564, AFL, 124 F. Supp.
697, 703 (D.N.M. 1954) (dictum).
However, this effect of Garnerand the jurisdictional standards
notwithstanding, instances remain where state courts will still
assume jurisdiction in cases involving labor disputes. In United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
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(1954), the activities of the defendant union, consisting primarily
of threats of violence and intimidation, forced the abandonment
of a construction project. The employer was awarded damages
against the union in a state court for the tortious conduct. The
court held that, in spite of the Garner case, supra, a state court
still retained its jurisdiction over conrnon law tort actions, although the conduct complained of arose out of action by a union
which was also an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley
Act.
Following the pattern of the Laburnum case, supra, it has been
held that where there is no unfair labor practice involved in
the case, a state court may properly exercise jurisdiction over
the controversy. Baun v. Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union,
AFL, 284 P.2d 275 (Cal. 1955) (alternative holding). The union
here attempted to force the employer to fire a certain supervisor by threatening to strike unless that person was fired.
Since supervisors were not protected by the Act, the court held
that it could provide a remedy to the complaining supervisor for
the tortious conduct of the union.
Jurisdiction was properly asserted by the court in Wortex
Mills Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, 380 Pa. 3, 109
A.2d 815 (1954), where the defendant union set up mass picket
lines and intimidated employees to such a degree that ninety
per cent of the plant's production was curtailed. The court held
that a state court had jurisdiction to enjoin mass picketing and
violence used in order to promote union organization. In Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. United Automobile Workers,
269 Wis. 578, 70 N.W.2d 191 (1955), defendant union intimidated
those employees desiring to work by mass picketing around the
plant, congested the public streets in mass groups, and picketed
the homes of employees, threatening personal injury. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Congress had not pre-empted
this field so that the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
could validly restrain this mass picketing and intimidation.
Where the employees were coerced, some violence had occurred, and further breaches of the peace were threatened, the
court in Perez v. Trifiletti, 74 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 926 (1955), held that a state court had jurisdiction to
enjoin the union from picketing the employer's place of business.
There was nothing in the record to indicate that the employer
was engaged in interstate commerce, but the court intimated
that even if the employer had been engaged in an interstate
business, the decision would be the same in this case.
The hiatus created by the previously mentioned "jurisdictional
yardsticks" has pointed with increasing favor toward state as-
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sumption of jurisdiction when the NLRB declines to take jurisdiction. In Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks' Local 1564, AFL,
supra, after defendant union had filed unfair labor practice
charges and the NLRB had refused to assume jurisdiction on
the basis of the "yardsticks test," the plaintiff employer sought
to enjoin the union's picketing in the state court on the ground
of trespass. The court held that where the NLRB had refused
to exercise jurisdiction because the interstate business of
the employer did not measure up in value to the jurisdictional
standards of the Board, a state court could enjoin the picketing,
if the picketing was determined to be a trespass subject to injunction.
On the basis of the above discussion, there appears to be two
well-settled instances where state courts will assume jurisdiction
over a labor dispute involving an interstate employer. These are,
firstly, where the conduct of the union is tortious, and secondly,,
where the NLRB has refused to exercise its jurisdiction. In the
first case, the state courts are merely exercising their traditional
jurisdiction over common law torts. The Taft-Hartley Act was not
meant to deprive the state courts of this jurisdiction. Garner v.
Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. at page 488. Secondly, it is entirely reasonable that where the NLRB has refrained from exercising its jurisdiction, the appropriate state court may then.
provide what relief is warranted under the circumstances.
In the principal case, where jurisdiction was denied by the
state court, it was indicated that "another question might arise"
should the NLRB decline to hear the case. The picketing was at
all times peaceful, and the NLRB had not yet been presented
with the case. In view of the specific instances set out above
where a state court may rightly assert jurisdiction in a limited
number of these cases, the decision that the lower court lacked
jurisdiction was sound.
Paul M. Kraus

SECONDARY BoYcoTTs - PICKETING OF A COMNLRB v. General Drivers, AFL, 225 F.2d 205
(5th Cir. 1955). 'Respondent union represented truckdriverswarehousemen employed by the Otis Massey Company. The company was engaged in the distribution to and the installation of
building materials in three building projects in the Houston,
Texas area. Among the employees at the location of the projects
were workers of diverse crafts, each represented by a particular:
union. The duties of the truckdrivers-warehousemen were largely
confined to the Otis Massey Company warehouse, except for ocLAnOR LAW
mON SiTUs. -

-
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casional deliveries of materials to the project sites. A dispute
between respondent union and Otis Massey resulted in a strike
and picketing by union members of the company's warehouse
and of the projects where its employees were wont to make
deliveries. The company charged a violation of section 8(b) (4)
(A) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952), contending that picketing of the project
sites by the union constituted a secondary boycott. The National
Labor Relations Board so held and issued a cease and desist
order. The Board now petitions the Court of Appeals for enforcement of its order.
The issue raised is whether picketing by a union on the
premises of a secondary employer constitutes a violation of
section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
supra, in instances where employees of the primary employer
spend a substantial amount of their working time on those
premises. The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's
order, holding that peaceful picketing on common premises
directed solely against the primary employer does not constitute
prohibited secondary activity. The basis for the court's decision
was that a fixing of the situs for strike purposes solely at the
primary employer's premises would deny to employees of the
primary employer engaged in activities elsewhere the right to
concerted efforts guaranteed by section 7 of the Act. 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952). Further, the harm suffered by
the secondary employer in such instances is incidental to the
exercise of that right, provided that the picketing is expressly
and solely directed against the primary employer.
The pertinent part of section 8 (b) (4) (A) provides that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor ogranization or its agents
to encourage the employees of any employer to strike or otherwise refuse to work where the object of such strike or refusal
to work is to have an employer cease to do business with any
other person. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952). This
provision was not intended to prohibit the primary means customarily used to attain union ends; and hence, primary strikes and
primary picketing as an adjunct thereto, are permissive. Ryan
Constr. Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949). Primary activity in its
simplest form is the picketing of an employer on premises used
exclusively by him. Where two or more employers are engaged
in the use of a common situs, however, picketing of one employer
may have adverse effects on the other employers and thereby
result in illegal secondary action. Under what factual conditions,
therefore, will picketing of an employer on a situs common to
one or more other employers constitute permissive primary
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activity?
In Pure Oil Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949), Pure Oil and Standard
Oil operated adjoining oil refineries. Pure Oil maintained a
pipeline from its refinery through Standard's refinery to the
latter's docks where Standard employees loaded Pure Oil's produce onto waiting ships. A strike at Standard resulted in picketing at Standard's dock and plant. Although Pure Oil supervisors
were dispatched to the Standard docks to load the Pure Oil cargo,
the National Maritime Union refused to handle the cargo. Since
the picketing was confined to the immediate vicinity of Standard
Oil premises, it was held to be permissive primary action. In the
Ryan Constr. Corp. case, supra, the Board affirmed the principle
that no secondary boycott exists where picketing is restricted to
the premises of the primary employer. The Ryan Construction
Company was erecting a wing on the Evansville Bucyrus plant
Bucyrus employees customarily used the main gate for purposes of
ingress and egress. Ryan Construction, to facilitate construction
operations, opened a hole through the fence surrounding the
plant for the use of its own employees. Bucyrus employees, upon
the outbreak of a strike, picketed the Ryan gate as well as the
main gate, with the result that Ryan employees refused to cross
the picket line. The Board realized the picketing had a secondary
effect, as in the Pure Oil Co. case, supra, but stated, 85 N.L.R.B.
at page 418:
When picketing is wholly at the premises of the employer with
whom the union is engaged in a labor dispute, it cannot be called
"secondary" even though, as is virtually always the case, an object
of the picketing is to dissuade all persons from entering such
premises for business reasons.
In Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949)
and in Sterling Beverages, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 401 (1950), picketing of an "ambulatory" or "roving" situs was involved. In the
Schultz case, supra, the respondent union picketed trucks of
Schultz at the premises of his customers and consignees in New
York City. The Schultz terminal was located in Slackwood, New
Jersey. Picketing at the secondary premises occurred only when
Schultz's trucks were at the premises, was done in the immediate
vicinity of the trucks, and was accompanied by express statements that the union's grievance was soley with the primary
employer. The Board held that where the forum of the employees'
duties is different than that of the employer's premises, the former
will be a proper situs for primary union activity and that the
picketing under the above circumstances was within primary
bounds. Picketing of a secondary employer's premises prior
to the arrival of the primary employer's truck and continued
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picketing after its departure has been held to be unlawful
secondary action. Sterling Beverages, Inc., supra. In so holding
the Board approved the criteria set forth in the Schultz case
supra, but distinguished the Sterling case on the basis of the
failure of the respondent union to confine its picketing to times
when trucks of the primary employer were physically present
at the secondary employer's premises.
In 1950 the Board set forth definitively the conditions under
which picketing of a secondary employer's premises would be regarded as primary and therefore permissive action. The Board
stated in Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950) at page
549:
fP]icketing of the premises of a secondary employer is primary
if it meets the following conditions: (a) The picketing is strictly
limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on the secondary
employer's premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary
employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) the
picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the
situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with
the primary employer.

The case arose from an attempt by the Sailors' Union to negotiate an hours, pay and working conditions agreement with the
owner of the S.S. Phopho, at a time when the ship was undergoing
conversion repairs at the Moore Company's drydock. When contract negotiations failed, the union requested Moore's permission
to picket within the shipyard premises at the S.S. Phopho's
particular dock. Moore refused, and the union thereupon picketed
at the company's gate. The Board held that the union's activities
met the quoted conditions and was therefore permissive. In
practical effect, the decision upset the Sdhultz case requirement
that picketing be conducted in the immediate vicinity of the
situs of dispute, i.e., by marching in a rectangular path around
the vehicles of the primary employer, and permitted it to be
conducted as reasonably close to the situs as possible, i.e., at the
secondary employer's gate where permission was denied to
enter the common premises to picket in the immediate vicinity
of the primary employer's situs.
The standards of the Moore Dry Dock Co. case, supra, were
set forth in a stated effort to balance the rights of striking
unions and neutral secondary employers, and have subsequently
been approved by the courts. NLRB v. Local 55, Carpenters
District Council, AFL, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Service Trade Chauffeurs Union, AFL, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951),
enforcement granted, 199 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1952). In the light of
these standards the Board has held that a section 8 (b) (4) (A)
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violation-had occurred where the union failed to clearly identify
the employer against whom the picketing was directed, Professional and Business Men's Life Ins. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 363 (1954),
and had not occurred where placards indicated the dispute to be
solely with the primary employer, John A. Piezonki d/b/a Stover
Steel Service, 108 N.L.R.B. 1575 (1954), order rev'd on other
grounds, 219 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1955).
The standards have not been applied in instances where a
primary employer has maintained a "principal plant." In Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953),
it was held that where a primary employer maintained a principal
plant in the community serviced by delivery trucks, picketing
was to be restricted to the main plant area, and that picketing
of trucks while parked at retail outlets constituted illegal
secondary activity. In so holding the Board distinguished the
present case from instances where the standards of the Moore
Dry Dock case were applicable, stating, 107 N.L.R.B. at page 303:
[I]n the Moore Drydock [sic] case the owners of the ship, which was
the situs of the picketing union's dispute with the ship owners, had
no permanent berth where the union could publicize the facts
concerning its dispute with the shipowners. Here, the Coca-Cola
plant, which the drivers enter and leave at least 4 times each day, is

located in downtown Washington and was picketed by the
Respondent Union from the first day of the strike.

The Board seemingly adopted the view that in "principal plant"
instances adequate opportunity for the effective exercise of concerted efforts exists at the principal plant site alone, and therefore refused to permit any possible adverse effects on neutral
employers even though business activities of the primary employer are conducted at their premises.
The "principal plant" doctrine has not been applied in instances where the main plant serves merely as a checking-in
and checking-out point for employees who spend their remaining working time at premises of another employer. In Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 455 (1954), the Board held that
under such circumstances the standards of the Moore Dry Dock
case are applicable, and that where they are met, picketing at
the premises of the secondary employer is permissive. In a recent
extension of the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. case, supra, it was
held that the "principal plant" doctrine would be inapplicable
where fifty percent of the employees' working hours were spent
at the common situs, even though the principal plant served as
more than a mere checking-in and checking-out point. Sales
Drivers, Helpers & Building Constr. Drivers v. NLRB, 24
U.S.L. WEEK 2252 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 1955). Seemingly the
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amount of use of common premises, and not the nature or
amount of use of the principal plant, is decisive of the applicability
of the "principal plant" doctrine.
The present decision is in accord with the Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. case. In both cases the decision has rested on
the right of employees to engage in concerted activities at the
situs where they perform the substantial portion of their work.
It is submitted that a strict application of the "principal plant"
doctrine in such instances curtails union rights beyond the degree intended by section 8 (b) (4) (A), and that an application
of the standards of the Moore Dry Dock Co. case protects
the rights of secondary employers to an extent consistent with
the Act. In accordance with these principles, the instant decision
is proper.
Jack Economou

PROPERTY-FLOOD WATERS-LANDOWNER CANNOT DIVERT FLOOD
WATERS TO INJURY OF NEIGHBORING OWNER.-Bahm

v. Raikes, 160

Neb. 503, 70 N.W. 2d 507 (1955). Defendant, in order to protect
his land from frequently occurring floods, built up dikes along
the banks of two streams running through his property, and
turned aside the natural channel of another stream so that it
would not flow upon his property at all. These embankments prevented the flood water from following the normal flood plane
across his land. As a result, the flood waters were diverted onto
plaintiffs' lands, rendering them virtually useless for the agricultural purposes for which they had formerly been used. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin defendant from maintaining the dikes, and to
force him to restore the natural channel of the stream which he
had diverted. A decree in favor of plaintiffs was entered in the
district court, and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of
Nebraska.
On appeal the question presented to the court was whether
a riparian owner could prevent flood waters from coming on his
land even though it resulted in injury to the land of his neighbor.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, affirning the lower court,
stated that since the flood waters in this case were part of a
running stream, the diversion of those waters was to be governed
by the same rules applicable to the diversion of a defined watercourse. It being well settled in Nebraska that a running stream
may not be diverted from its natural course, the court held that
the flood waters of a stream could not be diverted by one landowner to the injury of another.
The court, in Fordham v. Northern Pac. Ry., 30 Mont. 421,
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76 Pac. 1040, 1042 (1904), stated that the only important-question
to be considered in cases of this nature is whether the flood water
is to be treated as surface water or as part of a natural watercourse. The importance of this question lies in the fact that
separate legal rules govern the obstruction of surface water and
obstruction of a natural watercourse. The universal rule in
regard to water of a natural watercourse is that no riparian owner
may obstruct and divert its flow so that it is turned upon the land
of other owners to their injury. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Hadley,
168 Okla. 588, 35 P.2d 463 (1934). But there is a split of authority
as to a riparian owner's right to obstruct and divert surface water.
Some jurisdictions adopt the common law rule that the owner
of riparian land may ward off surface water from his land even
though it results in injury to the property of his neighbor, Watters
v. National Drive-In, Inc., 266 Wis. 432, 63 N.W.2d 708 (1954);
other jurisdictions follow the civil law rule that the owner must
allow surface water to drain across his land. Gough v. Goble, 2 IMl.
2d 577, 119 N.E.2d 252 (1954). A third view is expressed in Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948), as the reasonable use theory, under which the landowner has neither an
absolute right to divert surface water, nor an absolute duty to
receive it. According to this doctrine, the landowner may divert
surface water without incurring liability for damage to neighboring land when to do so would be a reasonable use of his own property.
Surface water is defined in Enderson v. Kelehan, supra, at page
288, as ".

.

. waters from rain, springs, or melting snow which lie

or flow on the surface of the earth, but which do not form part
of a well-defined body of water or natural watercourse." A test
by which to determine whether flood water is surface water or
part of a natural watercourse was suggested in Fordham v.
NorthernPac. Ry., supra, 76 Pac. at 1043:
Whether the water from the overflow of streams is to be considered
as still a part of the watercourse, or to be treated as surface water,
shall depend upon the configuration of the country, and the relative
position of the water after it has gone beyond the usual channel. If
the flood water becomes severed from the main current, or leaves
the same never to return, and spreads out over the lower ground,
it becomes surface water. But if it forms a continuous body with
the water flowing in the ordinary channel, or if it departs from
such channel presently to return, it is to be regarded as still a
part of the stream.

Following principles similar to those expressed in this test,
the usual finding of the courts is that flood water is still part
of the natural watercourse, either on the basis that it remains
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part of a single moving body of water, O'Connell v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., 87 Ga. 246, 13 S.E. 489 (1891); or leaves the
defined banks of the stream, but after an interim, flows again in
a definite channel, WeIlman v. Kelley, 197 Ore. 553, 252 P.2d 816
(1953); or remains within the flood channel even though overflowing the low water channel, Sund v. Keating, 43 Wash. 2d 36,
259 P.2d 1113 (1953).
Therefore the rule regarding obstructions of a natural watercourse will apply to flood water, leading to the conclusion
reached by the court in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Hadley, supra,
35 P.2d at 466, the court therein approving a quote from 16
A.L.R. 629 (1922):
A riparian owner has no right to construct an embankment or
barrier along the normal bank of the stream, to protect his land
from the overflow thereof, when such embankment or barrier will
cause the waters of the stream, in times of ordinary floods to
damage the lands of other riparian proprietors.
The rule has been sometimes put in converse form, to the effect
that the riparian owner may dike and embank against flood water
in order to protect his own property, but only so long as he does
not divert the water from his own land onto the property of his
neighbor to the injury of the latter. Godlin v. Hockett, 272 P.2d
389 (Okla. 1954). The instant case is in accord with this general
rule. The court reached its decision in the usual fashion, holding
that flood water is part of a natural watercourse, rather than
surface water, and therefore the law governing obstruction and
diversion of a natural watercourse is applicable to the situation.
In so doing, as indicated in the opinion, it has followed well
established precedent of the Nebraska courts. Beetison v. Ballou,
153 Neb. 360, 44 N.W.2d 721 (1950).
Another reason in support of the general rule that flood water
may not be obstructed to the injury of neighboring land is contained in the legal maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
that each owner must so use his land as not to injure that of
another. The decision in Crawford v. Rambo, 44 Ohio St. 279,
7 N.E. 429 (1886), emphasizes the applicability of this maxim
to the problem of ordinary flood waters.
In contrast to the majority of jurisdictions, it has been said by
some courts that flood water is surface water, not part of a
natural watercourse, and the rule as to diverting and obstructing
surface water applies. Sandstrum v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 39 F.2d
165 (D. Kan. 1925). This classification is made of flood water as
such, without regard to the distinctions of geographical connection to the flood stream set forth in the test suggested by Fordham
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v. Northern Pac. Ry., supra. To take this view and decide that
flood water is surface water and not part of a natural watercourse
gives rise to a split on the question of the riparian owner's right
to obstruct such water. In a jurisdiction that follows the common
law rule on surface water, the owner will be held to have a right
to dike and embank against flood water, even though he diverts
the water and causes injury to the land of his neighbor. De Ruwe
v. Morrison, 28 Wash. 2d 797, 184 P.2d 273 (1947). (In the light
of Sund v. Keating, supra, it would appear that the Washington
Supreme Court has limited the application of this rule to those
flood waters which exceed the banks of the defined flood
channel). But in a jurisdiction which follows the civil law rule
denying the right to divert and obstruct surface water, the
riparian owner must allow flood water to drain over his property
just as he is constrained to allow drainage to all other surface
water. Keck v. Venghause, 127 Iowa 529, 103 N.W. 773 (1905).
Still a third view prevails as to flood water and the riparian
owner's right of embankment. In Mogle v. Moore, 16 Cal. 2d
1, 104 P.2d 785 (1940), the defendant was held not liable for
diverting flood waters to the injury of the land of a neighboring
landowner, because under the California rule, flood water was
considered as a common enemy to be warded off by every landowner without liability for injurious consequences to other
owners. Under this rule, obviously, no question of surface water
versus natural watercourse will arise. The California courts
have found this rule beneficial in the flood water cases, claiming
that ".

.

. it is the only rule consistent with the development and

improvement of vast bodies of potentially rich and valuable lands
along low-lying river bottoms." Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal.
87, 196 Pac. 25, 30 (1921) (dictum). The common enemy rule has
been adopted in Arizona, Southern Pac. Co. v. Proebstel, 61 Ariz.
412, 150 P.2d 81 (1944); and in Indiana, Shelbyville and Brandywine Turnpike Co. v. Green, 99 Ind. 205 (1884), though later
Indiana cases indicate that Indiana has shifted over to the general
rule. See Watts v. Evansville, Mt. C. & Ry., 191 Ind. 27, 129
N.E. 315 (1921); Evansville, Mt. C. & N. Ry. v. Scott, 67 Ind.
App. 121, 114 N.E. 649 (1916).
In those jurisdictions which hold the riparian owner liable for
erecting barriers against flood water to the injury of his neighbor's land, there are two broad limitations upon a finding of
liability. First, the injury caused by the obstruction must be
substantial before liability will accrue, Crawford v. Rambo, supra,
and if the injury is only slight, the legal maxim de minimis is
applied. Knight v. Durham,136 S.W. 591 (Tex. 1911). Secondly,
the riparian owner may dike and embank with immunity from
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liability for resultant injury to neighboring property in the case
of extraordinary floods, which are ". .. such as from the ob-

servation and experience of men of ordinary prudence, familiar
with the river, would not reasonably be expected to occur."
Chesapeake& 0. Ry. v. Meriwether, 120 Va. 55, 91 S.E. 92 (1916).
The reason for this exception is that such vast unanticipated
volumes of flood water constitute a common enemy, against which
each man has the right to defend his property without regard
to resultant harm to his neighbor. Wellman v. Kelley, 197 Ore.
553, 252 P.2d 816, 820-1 (dictum).
Exceptions to the rule imposing liability for diverting flood
water by embankment were relied upon in Bass v. Taylor, 126
Tex. 522, 90 S.W.2d 811 (1936) (no liability for diking to repel
flood water in response to the plaintiff's pre-existing embankment which turned the waters upon the defendant's property) and
in Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Fleming, 203 Okla. 600, 225 P.2d
348 (1949) (no liability for diking to restore and maintain the
original banks of the stream against the erosive action of the
water).
From the cases above, it can be seen that the asserted rule
may be one of liability for the riparian owner-based on a finding
that flood water is part of a natural watercourse, or that it is
surface water in a civil law jurisdiction; or one of no liabilitybased on a finding that flood water is surface water in a common
law jurisdiction, or that it is a common enemy as under the
California rule. Whichever rule is used, it will be open to the
objection of being too rigid to allow for the infinite variables
which present themselves in the problem of embanking against
flood water. Both the traditional surface water versus natural
watercourse inquiry and the common enemy doctrine involve a
formalized approach and solution to the problem. A similar objection has been resolved in a closely related area of law, that of
diverting surface water, by resort to a reasonable use doctrine.
Enderson v. Kelehan, supra. It is submitted that the flood water
problem would be better solved by the application of a reasonable
use doctrine, applied to flood waters as such, to the effect that a
riparian owner may divert ordinary flood waters in protection
of his own property, if to do so would be a reasonable use of his
property in view of the benefit gained and the injury caused.
Robert P. Gorman

